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Hszieh et al.: Networking the Global Maritime Partnership

NET WORKING THE GLOBAL MARITIME
PARTNERSHIP
Stephanie Hszieh, George Galdorisi, Terry McKearney, and Darren Sutton

We will be prepared to support and defend our freedom of navigation
and access to the global commons. Our partners and allies are our greatest strategic asset.
ADMIRAL MICHAEL MULLEN

S

ix years after Admiral Michael Mullen, then Chief of Naval Operations, proposed his “thousand-ship navy” concept at the Seventeenth International
Seapower Symposium at the U.S. Naval War College in 2005, his notion of a
Global Maritime Partnership is gaining increasing currency within, between, and
among navies.1 As the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead, noted
in his remarks at the Nineteenth International Seapower Symposium in 2009,
navies worldwide are working mightily to enhance cooperation and interoperability on the global commons.2
Real-world operations, especially in the Pacific Rim, have demonstrated that
networking maritime forces is crucial to the effectiveness of operations that
run the gamut from humanitarian operations to dealing with insurgencies, to
nation-building, to state-on-state conflict. Additionally, these operations often
involve nations and navies that come together on short—or no—notice, and,
as a necessary condition for success in these operations, this networking must be
immediately available and robust.
The central themes of this article are that the technical challenges of netting
maritime forces together are not trivial and that overcoming these challenges is
more daunting today than at any time in history. Why? Simply because unlike the
days when flag hoists or simple radio transmissions were all that navies needed
to effectively work together, rapid technological change has reached nations and
navies unevenly and has actually impeded the effective networking of coalition
partners. To maintain the growth and development of global maritime partnerships around the world, this article proposes leveraging an example of one effort
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among long-standing partners to address the issue of naval interoperability at the
defense laboratory level.
Coalitions at sea are not new. However, globalization—one of the macrotrends of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries—has prompted many
nations to join together to maintain the security and stability of the maritime
domain. Globalization—generally understood as “the integration of the political,
economic, and cultural activities of geographically and/or nationally separated
peoples”—involves the international interaction of information, financial capital, commerce, technology, and labor at significantly greater speeds and volumes
than previously thought, and it impacts the lives and fortunes of all humanity.3 It
is important to recognize that globalization has a significant impact in the maritime domain, where events in one part of the world can swiftly impact peoples
and societies across the globe.
As globalization has grown over the past two decades, we have witnessed an
increase in maritime trade on the global commons. The tonnage of goods carried
across the oceans by the rapidly growing merchant fleets of the world has more
than quadrupled in the past four decades. This global exchange of goods has
brought ever-increasing prosperity to the community of nations.
With globalization and the concomitant dependence on reliable oceanic commerce come vulnerabilities. Those who would disrupt this trade and the rule of
law on the global commons, whether for economic or political gain, now have
far more opportunities to attack vessels on the high seas or in near-shore waters
than ever before. The dramatic increase in this century of piracy, a scourge many
thought no longer existed, is but one manifestation of the threat to the rule of
law on the global commons that the international community—and especially
navies—must address today.
Concurrently, the nexus of climate change, growing populations, and a demographic shift to coastal and near-coastal regions has resulted in a significant
increase in the impact of natural disasters—hurricanes, tsunamis, coastal flooding, volcanic events, earthquakes, and a host of others—that bring suffering to
millions. Often, only naval forces are capable of delivering relief supplies in a
timely fashion and in the volumes necessary to relieve disaster victims.
No single navy—of any nation—is robust enough to enforce the rule of law
on the global commons alone or respond adequately to a major natural disaster.
Today, through practice, global maritime partnerships have become the sine qua
non for nations working together as global forces for good in support of everincreasing levels of security, stability, and trust.
When navies assemble as a global force for good, a prerequisite for their ability to work together is that their ships, submarines, aircraft, command centers,
and forces ashore have the ability to exchange data and information—often in
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/4
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vast quantities—freely and seamlessly. Their effectiveness is directly proportional
to their ability not only to communicate but to network, at sea and ashore. But
as nations and navies proceed along different technological development paths,
the challenges to effective networking are greater today than they were years
ago, when navies used simpler—and more common—communications and
rudimentary networking means. Because of this, their ability to interoperate effectively is often challenged.
There are core reasons why navies have been especially impeded
Nations and navies are proceeding along difin their attempts to network efferent technological development paths. As a
result of this inexorable trend, naval coopera- fectively in this new century. While
the will is there, and though these
tion is under increasing stress.
navies are aligned through doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures to work and network together at sea, the
technical means to realize the promise of “network-centric operations” throughout
coalitions remain elusive.4 Achieving that promise means dealing with the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) issues that currently complicate this effective networking.
Navies have overcome similar challenges in the past, however, and understanding
where we have been can help the members of today’s naval coalition avoid becoming “victims of limited experience.”5
Naval coalitions have long been an important part of maintaining sea power
and good order on the seas. During the Cold War it was a naval alliance, under the
auspices of NATO, that was able, through the building of a credible nuclear and
conventional deterrent, to check Soviet encroachment into Europe.6 However,
coalition operations have taken on renewed importance as the maintenance of
good order at sea has become a pressing concern for the international community. Naval coalitions today tend to be heterogeneous with respect to the types
of navies represented, while the operations naval coalitions undertake have also
expanded to include antipiracy patrols, as well as disaster relief and humanitarian
missions. The importance of the ability to communicate with coalition partners
transcends warfare and impacts coalition naval partners in literally every endeavor. This was dramatically demonstrated in December 2004 and early 2005 during
the Indian Ocean tsunami response, where eighteen nations worked together,
primarily on and from the sea, to deliver relief supplies.7
As they do for naval coalitions in general, naval communications continue to
represent an integral part of successful naval operations, because they allow commanders to create the all-important “operational picture.” In the arena of naval warfare, communications are needed to maintain “dominant battlespace awareness”
—knowledge of where one’s enemies and one’s own forces are. Out of this
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
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knowledge comes the ability to plan and strategize to defeat the enemy. In 1904,
Britain’s First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir John Fisher, took advantage of the new
communications technology of his time—the telegraph—and developed what
Norman Friedman calls “picture-based warfare.”8 Admiral Fisher established two
war rooms—one for the world, the other focused on the North Sea—to collate
information received from telegraphic messages to plot where French commerce
raiders were attacking British merchant ships. Armed with this picture-based
view of the world, Admiral Fisher was able to direct battle cruisers to the spots.9
Future British commanders built on Admiral Fisher’s successful harnessing of
communications technologies to construct a global tactical picture—one that
served them well in the years leading up to World War I, as well as during that
conflict.
The innovative use of communications technologies to better conduct picturebased warfare continues in contemporary naval operations. Throughout the
1990s and into the twenty-first century, other initiatives have included the National Defense University’s Dominant Battlespace Concept; Admiral William
Owens’s “system of systems”; military transformation and the revolution in
military affairs (RMA); and the concept of “network-centric warfare” popularized by Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski and John Garstka. All these have led to
significant focus on using communications to provide U.S. forces and their coalition partners a better ability to build a common picture to conduct picture-based
warfare and, in so doing, secure the tactical, operational, and strategic advantage.
But what these reformers—and others like them—have really been talking about
is moving beyond merely communicating between and among units to networking forces and forming them into single fighting entities.
COMMUNICATING EVOLVES INTO NETWORKING FOR MODERN
NAVIES
Above all, the picture is what matters. Creating effective tactical pictures
makes systems work, and it supports a new kind of warfare. The better
the picture, the more efficient the operation.
DR. NORMAN FRIEDMAN

In the latter part of the twentieth century, the U.S. Navy, reflecting its traditional
style of operations—which entailed the continuous forward deployment of a
distributed force far from U.S. territory or supporting infrastructure—developed
the concept of “networking” to ensure timely and reliable communications to
enable the most effective employment of scattered forces.10 This effort included
experimentation with the Tactical Data Information Exchange System (TADIXS),
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which was the progenitor of the tactical data systems, such as Link 11, shared by
many navies today.
Armed with increasingly reliable tactical data links, global navies began to
recognize the potential of this ability to link ships across vast distances to revolutionize naval warfare. As Loren Thompson pointed out in 2003, however, many
of the concepts driving the networking of military forces today arose two decades
ago:
In 1990, long before network-centric warfare became a central feature of joint
doctrine, the Navy established a program called “Copernicus” to assimilate emerging
information technologies. . . . The admirals managing Copernicus understood that
information technologies had the potential to revolutionize naval operations. The
Navy adopted the phrase “network-centric warfare” to describe this nascent warfighting paradigm, because it stressed integration and communications over autonomy in
conducting naval operations.11

Eight years later, Vice Admiral Cebrowski and John Garstka built on Copernicus to envision war fighting in the twenty-first century. Their 1998 U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings article, “Network-centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future,”
described the potential of network-centric concepts to alter the nature of warfare
itself. Although the article was published well over a decade ago, their vision of
network-centric warfare proved remarkably prescient:
Network-centric warfare derives its power from the strong networking of a wellinformed but geographically dispersed force. The enabling elements are a highperformance information grid, access to all appropriate information sources,
weapons reach and maneuver with precision and speed of response, value-adding
command and control (C2) processes—to include high-speed automated assignment
of resources to need—and integrated sensor grids closely coupled in time to shooters
and C2 processes. Network-centric warfare is applicable to all levels of warfare and
contributes to the coalescence of strategy, operations, and tactics. It is transparent to
mission, force size and composition, and geography.12

Theory met reality in the early part of the twenty-first century, when the United States, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, launched Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (known as OEF) to attack terrorist strongholds in
Afghanistan. The ensuing campaign vindicated what the proponents of networkcentric warfare had been advocating. As Admiral Vern Clark, then Chief of Naval
Operations, later observed regarding the U.S. Navy’s experience in OEF, “Eighty
percent of the Navy strike sorties attacked targets that were unknown to the aircrews when they left the carriers. They relied upon networked sensors and joint
communications to swiftly respond to targets of opportunity.”13
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Admiral Clark evolved a vision for the U.S. Navy called “Sea Power 21: Operational Concepts for a New Era.”14 Some critics described the three pillars of Sea
Power 21 (Sea Shield, Sea Strike, and Sea Basing) as “old wine in new bottles,” but
with them Admiral Clark introduced a new term, “FORCEnet,” which referred to
“an initiative to tie together naval, joint and national information grids to achieve
unprecedented situational awareness and knowledge management.”15 FORCEnet
was clearly the next step in the evolution of the Navy’s networking capabilities.
Thompson noted that “Forcenet [sic] was the greatest system-integration challenge ever proposed in the history of warfare.”16 Whether this is true or not, the
U.S. Navy made an enormous capital investment in FORCEnet and in the wide
array of programs that instantiate the network-centric warfare concept.17
The ability of navies to network vast amounts of data at high speed over
great distances—due to the advancement of C4ISR technologies over the past
decades—has ushered in new capabilities, pushed the “information envelope,”
and expanded the “art of the possible” at sea. It is not an overstatement to say that
C4ISR systems have become the sine qua non of success for most modern navies.
In fact, navies have found conclusively that their effectiveness is proportional to
their ability to network at sea and ashore. Accordingly, every modern navy has
sought to install C4ISR networking technologies—often as rapidly as they can
afford them—in order to gain that technological edge at sea.
Drawing on real-world results from the U.S.-led coalition conflicts in Kosovo,
Afghanistan, and Iraq, the U.S. General Accounting Office (now the Government
Accountability Office) summed up the results of these conflicts:
Network-centric operating concepts have improved battlefield situation awareness for commanders and their forces. DoD [the U.S. Department of Defense] has
indicated that technological improvements in information-gathering systems allow
commanders an unprecedented view of the battlefield. Such improvements provide for greater shared situational awareness, which, in turn, speeds command and
control. . . . Improvements in networking the force and the use of precision weapons
are the primary reasons for the overwhelming combat power demonstrated in recent
operations.18

C4ISR advances not only benefit so-called high-end navies, but any navy investing in naval C4ISR technologies can gain a tactical edge. As pointed out by Paul
Mitchell in 2003 in this journal,
Network-centric warfare aims at increasing the efficiency of the transfer of maritime
information among participating units (or nodes). By optimizing the efficiency of
operations through information exchange, even small naval formations can generate
additional combat power. Data is manipulated by a series of dynamic and interlinked
“grids”: sensor grids gather the data, information grids fuse and process it, and engagement grids manage the operations generated.19
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Network-centric concepts are also being applied to developing local and regional maritime situational awareness, through various maritime domain awareness (MDA) information-sharing efforts. In short, MDA efforts are also part of
building global maritime partnerships, as various regional information-sharing
partnerships are netting up the global maritime commons. Efforts such as the
establishment of Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Centers
(MHQ/MOC) for the numbered fleets in the U.S. Navy are geared to provide the
capability to support MDA operations globally. National programs in the United
States—such as the Container Security Initiative, Automatic Identification System (AIS), Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT), and Maritime Safety and Security Information System (MISSIS)—are part of the multiagency effort to build MDA capability to support the defense of the homeland.20
Other nations have similar efforts to build up regional situational awareness
of the maritime domain. In the pirate-infested waters of the Malacca Strait, the
trinational effort of Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia (MALSINDO) began as
a means of protecting the sea-lanes in the region from illegal activities—piracy,
smuggling, etc. The regional cooperation also brought about Project SURPIC
in 2005, when Singapore and Indonesia developed a joint surveillance system to
share information regarding vessel movements in the Singapore Straits.21 Singapore also established the ACCESS system and the Regional Maritime Information
Exchange (ReMIX) Internet-based system to encourage information exchanges
with other nations in the region.22
The U.S. Navy is actively engaged with regional partners and longtime allies
to build information-exchange agreements and relationships to enhance global
maritime partnerships in order to support global maritime domain awareness.
There is currently work under way between the U.S. Navy and the French Ministry of Defense to share information obtained from the U.S. Navy’s AIS Program
of Record and France’s SPATIONAV coastal systems. This information-sharing
agreement, spearheaded by the U.S. Navy’s Space and Naval Warfare Systems
Center Pacific (SSC Pacific), will extend U.S. awareness of vessel movement in
the European region and also the French Caribbean. The latter will provide the
United States with valuable information to support drug interdiction efforts
in the Caribbean. The final phase of the plan would allow the United States
and France to exchange information and analysis regarding noncooperative, or
“dark,” targets in order to identify maritime threats. Work is also under way with
another partner nation, Singapore, to integrate satellite imagery with AIS information to track vessel movements.
Maritime domain awareness efforts within the U.S. Navy have also been extended to developing regions to build new partnerships. One example of this is
a Sixth Fleet–sponsored project to provide the government of Ghana with the
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012

7

18

Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 2, Art. 4

N AVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

ability to characterize vessel traffic in the Gulf of Guinea. SSC Pacific scientists
and engineers supporting the Sixth Fleet work with the University of Ghana to
train students on open-source image processing. There is also a project going on
with the University of Ghana to track canoes fitted with radar reflectors and AIS
transmitters. The small-boat detection trials and training of imagery analysts in
that region help not only to build new relationships but also to develop a capability for persistent maritime domain awareness in the Gulf of Guinea.
Through these and other MDA efforts, the maritime domain is being netted
and global maritime partnerships are being strengthened with these emerging
information-sharing agreements. However, the ability of different naval forces to
engage in similar information-sharing activities at sea remains a work in progress.
As mentioned earlier, new C4ISR technologies have had a dramatic impact on the
ability of many navies to network with their own ships, submarines, aircraft, and
command centers. This has led to a situation where various components within
each navy can exchange large amounts of information. In doing so, these navies
have found that they become more effective across the spectrum of conflict, from
peacemaking to counterinsurgency, to major conflict.
However, this rush to install cutting-edge technology in each navy has had just
the opposite effect on its ability to network effectively with assets of other navies.
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that nations and navies are proceeding
along different technological development paths. As a result of this inexorable
trend, naval cooperation is under increasing stress.
NETWORKING THE GLOBAL MARITIME PARTNERSHIP: HOW BIG A
CHALLENGE?
In today’s world, nothing significant can get done outside of a coalition
context, but we have been humbled by the challenges of devising effective
coalition communications.
DR. DAVID ALBERTS

The experience of the Canadian navy in numerous deployments with U.S. Navy
carrier strike groups (CSGs) suggests the issues that persist even among two
modern, technologically advanced navies, let alone between and among multiple
navies at various levels of technological maturity.23 This documented experience
—as well as other compelling data—illustrates how the very technology that has
helped each navy communicate internally has impeded effective communications with forces of other navies. Paul Mitchell, then director of academics at
the Canadian Forces College, puts this dilemma in stark terms: “Is there a place
for small navies in network-centric warfare? Will they be able to make any sort
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of contribution in multinational naval operations of the future? Or will they be
relegated to the sidelines, undertaking the most menial of tasks, encouraged to
stay out of the way—or stay at home? . . . The ‘need for speed’ in network-centric
operations places the whole notion of multinational operations at risk.”24
In 2010 General James Mattis, then commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command,
echoed Mitchell’s themes as well as more general concerns regarding networking: “In this age, I don’t care how tactically or operationally brilliant you are, if
you cannot create harmony—even vicious harmony—on the battlefield based
on trust across service lines, across
What reformers have really been talking about coalition and national lines, and
is moving beyond merely communicating
across civilian/military lines, you
between and among units to networking forces really need to go home, because
and forming them into single fighting entities. your leadership style is obsolete.”25
But how important is coalition
networking, and what is the “state of play” today, as U.S. Navy combat formations
attempt to communicate and share data with coalition partners and to achieve
shared situational awareness?26 Some would say that it is not yet what it should
be. As Mitchell predicts, absent more effective means to network and exchange
data, navies may even stop attempting to operate together. He raises what is perhaps the most important question regarding coalition naval communications:
What level of communications and networking is required to make coalition
operations at sea effective?
Mitchell did not ask this question offhandedly. For a number of years the Canadian navy has deployed surface combatants with U.S. Navy CSGs for six-month
deployments. In that environment the effectiveness of coalition interoperability
moves from theory to the reality of high-tempo, forward naval operations—
operations that often involved combat. Mitchell has interviewed the commanding officers of seven Canadian ships that deployed with U.S. Navy CSGs to
determine how effectively they were able to communicate with their U.S. Navy
partners. The results indicated that while significant progress has been made,
more work needs to be done.
The experience of these Canadian commanding officers, as well as of others
working with U.S. naval forces in NATO exercises or operations, is that the “need
for speed” in network-centric operations may result in the exclusion of even
close allies. Thus, Mitchell asserts, while the guiding principle of network-centric
warfare is to increase the speed and efficiency of operations, coalitions as such
are rarely concerned about combat efficiency. Rather, their fundamental realities
are always the scarcity of operational resources or the limits of their political legitimacy, or both. This point led Mitchell to conclude that because of the impact
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of slower networks or non-networked ships in a dynamic coalition environment,
the prospects of the U.S. Navy’s keeping “in step” with coalition partners is not
high—absent enlightened efforts by all governments concerned.27
At a 2003 international C4ISR symposium, Mitchell put it directly during a
question-and-answer period:
We have been trying to work with the U.S. Navy for a long time. Ten years ago when
we basically communicated by the red phone [tactical voice nets] we did all right
because it was pretty much a level playing field. Five years ago, with CHALLENGE
ATHENA and the beginnings of networked communications, it started to become
more difficult for us as the U.S. Navy sped away from its partners. Today, with the
emerging FORCEnet, the U.S. Navy is in danger of leaving behind other navies
because all of the background and decision making that goes on over networks like
SIPRNET [Secret Internet Protocol Router Network] is lost to us [;] thus, when the
order is given to do something we have none of the background for it and we are not
in the battle rhythm of the operation.28

The situation Mitchell describes represents the reality of current coalition
operations at sea and indicates that there is important work yet to be done. This
is consistent with what proponents of network-centric operations have been professing for some time. In a capstone publication of the Department of Defense
Office of Force Transformation, the late Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski opined,
“The United States wants its partners to be as interoperable as possible. Not being
interoperable means you are not on the net, so you are not in a position to derive
power from the information age.”29
If this is such an important issue, why have naval professionals not worked
harder and more vigorously to solve it, and why have we not found a solution
yet? Part of the problem lies in the differing relative success that navies have had
networking at sea. Even in the days of signal flags, ships at sea found ways to
communicate to some degree. As technology advanced from flashing lights to
radio Morse code, to tactical radio voice circuits, to tactical data links, ships at
sea often had it better than forces ashore on expanded battlefields. The assurance
that “we’ve communicated at sea before and we’re doing so today” obscures how
well we could communicate and exchange data if the right technology, doctrine,
tactics, techniques, and procedures were in place.
The importance of coalition partners effectively networking has perhaps been
best articulated by Commander Alberto Soto, of the Chilean navy, in an article
in this journal: “The availability of a cooperatively created tactical picture has
long been a ‘dream of naval commanders who wanted to be able to see what was
over the horizon.’”30 He argues the criticality of building and sharing an effective common operational picture within a coalition, noting that “regional navies
have disparate capabilities, with major differences in terms of C4ISR. . . . [A]llies
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/4

10

HSZIEH, GALDORISI,
Hszieh et al.: Networking the Global Maritime
Partnership

MCKEARNEY, & SUT TON

21

do not acquire or develop command-and-control systems or surveillance and
reconnaissance assets with the main goal of exchanging information with other
potential allies.”31
For the U.S. Navy, there is another complicating factor. Almost all officers who
attain high rank in that service have served as carrier strike group commanders,
typically as their first afloat assignments as flag officers. As a CSG commander,
they experienced the “best of the best” in the way of communications and dataexchange capabilities—with robust displays, ample switching and routing capabilities, and high bandwidth. Additionally, coalition nets such as CENTRIXS
are likely to be installed on the flagship, the aircraft carrier, and that is where
coalition naval officers embark for most exercises.32 Thus, as carrier strike group
commanders advance through policy and acquisition assignments, their collective memories of coalition communications and data-exchange capabilities
are often quite positive, their operational experience rarely having given them
first-person knowledge of significant problems. But their experiences constitute
the exception—not the rule—for they have generally not experienced coalition
networking from the position of international surface combatants attempting to
work with U.S. Navy ships.
There is another, perhaps more important, reason why an effective solution
still eludes operators who want to solve this issue. Coalition interoperability does
not fit into any requirements “bin,” for either the U.S. Navy or, most likely, coalition partners. It does not fly, float, or operate beneath the seas. It does not strike
the enemy from afar, like cruise missiles. It does not enhance readiness, like spare
parts or training. It therefore often does not have the requisite degree of highlevel advocacy. This is not to imply that those in charge of setting requirements
or acquiring weapons systems are not keen on doing the right thing—clearly they
are. However, the definition of operational needs, the requirements-generation
process, and acquisition practices have grown up over decades, even generations,
and changing them to factor in coalition communications adequately takes a
great deal of time and attention.
As yet, this is a journey that is incomplete, and part of the reason is an inability to quantify the “goodness” derived from coalition networking. With naval
establishments and acquisition bureaucracies increasingly driven by the rules of
the marketplace—measures of effectiveness, returns on investment, best business
practices, and efficiency—the absence of quantification makes it difficult to argue
for scarce research and development, and especially acquisition dollars.
But it is a process that must take place if the U.S. Navy and its likely coalition
partners are to operate at sea effectively for the next century. As Mitchell points
out, “In network-centric warfare information is the cornerstone of all action;
the existence of separate networks operating at different speeds will have an
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
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undeniable impact on battle rhythms.”33 Clearly, overcoming uneven or uncoordinated application of C4ISR technology by nations that would work together
to form a global maritime partnership is an essential first step in making that
partnership a reality.34
HARNESSING THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMUNITY: THE
AUSCANNZUKUS WAY
We will win—or lose—the next series of wars in our nation’s laboratories.
ADMIRAL JAMES STAVRIDIS

For the U.S. Navy, the technical challenges of networking effectively with likely
coalition partners are not trivial.35 The problem is twofold in nature: first, quantifying the difference in operational effectiveness between that of a coalition force
networked via U.S. Navy infrastructure provided by the Consolidated Afloat
Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES, discussed below) and that of a coalition force less robustly networked; and second, finding a way for likely coalition
partners to coevolve maritime systems in a way that enables maximum networking among ships and other platforms.36
The issue of coevolution is an important one, because for navies determined
to work with other, often smaller, navies as global maritime partners, a cooperative arrangement regarding technology development is crucial.37 This implies
early and frequent collaboration among scientists and engineers in the laboratories of these navies, as well as those of other prospective global maritime partners.
One vehicle for such cooperation among Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the
United Kingdom, and the United States—the five AUSCANNZUKUS nations
—is The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP). Although it has existed in
various forms for over half a century, TTCP is not well-known, even among
AUSCANNZUKUS naval personnel. Importantly, while an analysis of coalition
interoperability along other lines is certainly possible, TTCP’s organization and
infrastructure provide a ready-made medium that makes success probable.
TTCP is a forum for defense science and technology collaboration. Established
as a joint effort between the defense organizations of the partner nations, TTCP
is one of the largest collaborative defense science and technology activities in the
world. The statistics give some indication of its scope: five nations, eleven technology and systems groups, eighty technical panels and action groups, 170 organizations, and 1,200 scientists and engineers are involved. The forum’s purpose
is to enhance national defense and reduce costs. To this end, TTCP provides a
formal framework that scientists and technologists can use to share information.
Collaboration within TTCP acquaints participants with each other’s defense
research and development programs so that national programs may be planned
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/4
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in concert. TTCP has its center of gravity in the applied research domain but also
encompasses basic research and technology development. Its scope extends to exploration of alternative concepts prior to development of specific systems; collaborative research; sharing of data, equipment, material and facilities; joint trials and
exercises; and advanced technology demonstrations. Cooperation within TTCP
can catalyze project-specific collaboration farther along the acquisition path.
Enhancing Coalition Interoperability: MAR AG-1 and AG-6
In response to a mutually perceived need to assess the quantitative value of
network-centric naval forces, in 2002 TTCP’s Maritime Systems Group (MAR)
established Action Group One (AG-1) to conduct a three-year “Network-centric
Maritime Warfare” collaborative study. The study produced robust quantitative assessments of the benefits of the adoption by coalition naval forces of a networked
force structure. The report of AG-1 prompted leaders of the MAR in 2005 to charter a second investigative team, Action Group Six (AG-6), to examine the impact
the U.S. Navy’s FORCEnet concept would have on coalition operations.38
In establishing the basic requirements for the technologies to be included in
the study, AG-6 began by seeking a common understanding of the operational
environment facing a coalition naval force. The group developed a scenario that
evolved from a disaster assistance/humanitarian relief effort to a counterterrorism operation, and finally a high-tempo conflict at sea. Four principal measures
of effectiveness were devised to compare the success of a coalition force that fully
leveraged the U.S. Navy’s FORCEnet capability to that of one not networked.
In addition, AG-6 members shared the “technology on-ramps” of their respective national acquisition programs in order to find where complementary technological capabilities could be inserted into naval C4ISR systems. The impacts
and value of alternative coalition network structures were modeled and assessed.
The result was a set of quantitative tools that could be adopted by the acquisition
branches of the AG-6 nations.
Similarly, TTCP nations have come to regard the early manifestations of
maritime net-centricity, such as FORCEnet, as stepping-stones on a path—a
path marked out by the TTCP’s “Maritime Net-centric Roadmap”—to becoming “fully net-enabled.” The next step is the implementation of an information
architecture to deliver the military capabilities and benefits that nations perceive
as offered by network-centric warfare.
For its part, the U.S. Navy is committed to transforming, over the next several
years, its current afloat network capability and global C2 infrastructure into the
Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services. The development of
CANES will produce a “service-oriented architecture” (SOA), wherein applications, services, and data are provided to “communities of interest.” SOA leverages a “publish and subscribe” messaging pattern in which information services,
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often external to any given system, are published to the network, which can then
be subscribed to (i.e., utilized) by other systems and users. CANES incorporates
information technology and network services currently provided to coalition
partners under the CENTRIXS umbrella, making the development of CANES
a critical concern to the AUSCANNZUKUS community as the pathway to the
Maritime Net-centric Roadmap’s goal of full net enablement and ultimate convergence with the future Global Information Grid.39
The AG-6 study quantified how
disparities in C4I capability within
Networking maritime forces is crucial to the
effectiveness of operations that run the gamut a U.S.-led coalition force underfrom humanitarian operations to dealing with mine its effectiveness in a range
of missions, ultimately disenfraninsurgencies, to nation-building, to state-onchising less capable units. The mistate conflict.
gration of U.S. Navy networking
capabilities to new architectures like CANES could increase that disparity, even
introduce invasive and disruptive effects not well understood by the United States
or its allies. The conclusions of the AG-1 and AG-6 studies, as well as ongoing
TTCP studies, should help allied nations stay aligned as the U.S. Navy transitions
to CANES. The AG-1 and AG-6 studies have given the MAR an excellent appreciation of U.S. and allied maritime capabilities, along with modeling frameworks
and tools that can support recommendations to national leaderships. A further
MAR study is under way that will provide an analytical assessment of requirements, funding, and execution of national programs to sustain U.S.-allied interoperability in a CANES SOA environment. It will clarify for national decision
makers the impact of such technologies upon future network architecture.
As it relates to the planned integration of coalition network services (e.g.,
CENTRIXS), this new study will inform the U.S. Navy’s CANES development
process by raising awareness of the value and impact of C4I technologies potentially incorporated into CANES. (It will raise the awareness of allied navies as
well—such inclusive efforts are often more useful for informing important constituencies than for providing prescient new information.) Like previous studies,
it will inform national acquisition agencies of what will be required, in terms of
coalition SOA, to enable TTCP navies to participate in future global maritime
partnership (GMP) net-enabled maritime operations. Also, it will provide validated analytical tools and techniques that nations can reuse to explore national
service-oriented architectures for their own interservice operations.
Leveraging TTCP Efforts across Global and Regional Maritime Partnerships
TTCP represents the work of only five nations, and the MAR AG-1/AG-6 effort
represents only a small fraction of that work. Nonetheless, the issue of coalition
networking is sufficiently compelling and the TTCP process so plainly worthy of
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/4
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emulation that outside observers consider it a best-practices example and argue
for similar efforts by other national groups. Commander Soto writes,
Since 2002 the Technical Cooperation Program . . . has focused the efforts of its Maritime Systems Group (MSG) on “Networking Maritime Coalitions” and “FORCEnet
and Coalitions Implications.” The MSG has become an important link among
national naval C4ISR acquisition programs. . . . For that very reason these [Latin
American and Caribbean] nations should tenaciously strive to become involved in
initiatives like the MSG.40

Other nations and navies, in natural clusters, can indeed take advantage of the
policies and processes that TTCP has instituted within the AUSCANNZUKUS
nations. They can replicate the TTCP model where it makes the most sense for
them. As Commander Soto suggests, the navies of South America represent one
such grouping. The ASEAN nations offer another, one that already has several
collaborative forums. NATO offers yet another, and given the wide range of similar efforts already under way there, such as the NATO Network Enabled Capability (NEC) C2 Maturity Model, the way forward may be easier than some think.
{LINE-SPACE}
It is important and necessary to use work such as TTCP or NATO’s NEC as a
means to harmonize national C4ISR acquisition programs, because the challenge
is so great. This challenge has persisted for quite some time, as pointed out over a
decade ago in an analysis of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, in Bosnia:
Coalition operations such as Joint Endeavor present a complex set of challenges for
the military C4ISR system planners, implementers, and operators. The most difficult
challenge is the provision of integrated C4ISR services and capabilities to support
the needs of ad hoc multinational military force structures and politically driven
command arrangements. Although integrated C4ISR services are the desired objective, the realities tend to drive the solution to stove-piped implementations. In spite
of technology advances, this will likely be the case for some time to come. There will
continue to be uneven C4ISR capabilities among coalition members who will continue to rely on systems with which they are most comfortable—their own.41

Lest anyone think this issue is already solved in 2012 (or will solve itself shortly), effective networking is now a “wicked problem” for navies attempting to deal
not with a “high end” environment like antisubmarine, antiair, or antisurface
warfare but with the basic task of combating piracy. The editors of a recent collected work on piracy and maritime crime highlight the importance of effective
maritime surveillance in countering piracy: “Clearly, maritime surveillance is the
key to gaining a better understanding of what is happening on the oceans, but
currently, systems are not integrated within each country, let alone at regional or
global levels.”42
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It is beyond debate that the U.S. Navy will continue to partner with other
navies to secure the rule of law on the global commons and that the effectiveness
of this combined global force will rise or fall on its ability to network at sea. The
Technical Cooperation Program provides an example of how nations can plant
the technological seed in making C4ISR systems compatible with their partners,
just as they have been able to do within their own fleets. It is a model that must be
applied—and quickly—to the navies with which the U.S. Navy will work at sea. If
these networking challenges are not addressed, the Global Maritime Partnership
will remain only a concept and never deliver its promise.
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